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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
Anita Deville appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, which granted her employer‟s motion for summary judgment in 
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her action alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 
and the New Jersey Law Against Age Discrimination (“NJLAD”). In a related and 
consolidated appeal, Deville‟s attorney, Vanessa R. Elliott, appeals from the District 
Court‟s order sanctioning her for misconduct during the discovery phase of this suit. We 
will affirm both orders. 
I. 
The parties are familiar with the events that gave rise to this appeal. We therefore 
set forth the following facts—which we draw from Deville‟s complaint, from the docket 
sheet, from the statement of undisputed facts she submitted to the District Court, and 
from those portions of Givaudan‟s statement of undisputed facts that Deville admitted to 
be true—only as required to explain our reasoning. 
Anita Deville was 57 years old when she filed this age discrimination suit. For 
approximately 20 years she was an employee of Givaudan Fragrances Corporation, a 
company that produces fragrances for colognes and other consumer products. In 2000, 
Deville became an account executive for a Givaudan client who, for confidentiality 
reasons, we shall refer to as “Client A.” Although she received some favorable reviews 
for her work with Client A, a 2001 employee development plan identified presentation 
skills as one of Deville‟s areas of weakness. In 2006, she made a presentation she later 
called “horrendous” to the entire Givaudan sales team. That same year, Deville‟s 
supervisor was considering whether to promote her from Client A‟s “account executive” 
to its “senior account executive.” Givaudan‟s United States Consumer Products President 
sent her supervisor an email that read in pertinent part: 
While I agree [Deville] has done a reasonable job, my concern remains that 
she is not the ideal long term fit for the account. . . . or the company. It is 
my belief that we should have the best people in our best business. I am OK 
with your decision and proposal, but just keep in mind that if we promote 
her and then decide that we need a better quality of person, it would be 
almost impossible to let her go. By promoting her we are reinforcing that 
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she is doing a great job which, when combined with her age and her gender, 
will make it very difficult to make a change. 
(App. 5-6.) 
In March of 2007, Givaudan bought a flavors and fragrance company called Quest 
International. The acquisition required eliminating some job positions, because Quest had 
a person who handled Client A. Faced with a choice between Deville and Quest‟s 
employee, who is 6 years younger than Deville and who was Quest‟s Vice President of 
International Accounts for Client A, Givaudan selected the Quest employee. In June of 
2007, Givaudan notified Deville that her employment with the company would end. 
In the fall of 2007, Givaudan began advertising an open retail sales position in 
New York City. The job opening was listed as “master‟s degree preferred,” and 
“required” a bachelor‟s degree. Although she did not hold either degree, Deville applied. 
During her November 2007 interview, Deville told her interviewer that she had filed an 
EEOC charge alleging that Givaudan‟s decision to end her employment was motivated by 
age discrimination. (In fact, she had not yet filed an EEOC charge, although she had 
completed certain intake paperwork with the EEOC.) Deville did not get the job—
Givaudan selected “M.G.,” who was a current Givaudan employee with a master‟s degree 
in marketing and management of cosmetics and fragrance, from the New York Fashion 
Institute of Technology. 
One month later, on December 18, 2007, Deville filed a formal EEOC charge 
against Givaudan. On April 24, 2008, before the EEOC made findings or issued a right-
to-sue letter, Deville filed this lawsuit. She alleged age discrimination and retaliation in 
violation of the ADEA and the NJLAD. After Givaudan‟s answer, the District Court set a 
discovery schedule. 
Two discovery events are relevant to this appeal. The first occurred during the 
deposition of an expert witness named Michael Soudry. Elliott produced Soudry to testify 
about alleged statistical evidence of age discrimination at Givaudan. While deposing this 
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witness, Givaudan‟s attorney, Wendy Lario, discovered that Soudry had relied upon lists 
and data that Elliott had not produced or shared with the defense. When Lario asked 
Soudry why he had not included this information in his report, Elliott made repeated 
interjections that not only prevented Soudry from answering, but provided answers on his 
behalf: 
Lario: . . . I do know that the list that we‟ve just marked as Soudry 12 was 
produced to you in response to a request, actually in response to an 
interrogatory that asked for identification of those who were retirees and 
who were not terminated. It is a list that Mr. Soudry has acknowledged that 
he reviewed, so for purposes of my deposition, I‟d like to continue without 
your interruption. 
Elliott: Well, he excluded this list from his report because it had nothing to 
do with . . . involuntary termination. 
Lario: In connection with your terminated list, you also indicated that you 
excluded New York employees, correct? 
Elliott: It‟s possible that this list— 
Lario: Ms. Elliott, please[.] 
Elliott: Let me clarify. I think this list is an incorrect list of what he relied 
upon. 
Lario: Please, can we please just focus on— 
Elliott: We are assuming that this list is correct, and when we are looking at 
the second page of the attachments to Soudry 8— 
Lario: Okay— 
Elliott: —I think that that would explain it, because the point is there were 
over ten employees that he included as 55 and over, and he did several 
analyses, so he produced this, this document from his computer, but it‟s 
some other analysis. 
. . . . 
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Elliott: I really think that that‟s what explains it that this list is wrong. It‟s 
the same number of people. If you take out the New York people and leave 
in the so-called retirees, it‟s the same number of people. 
. . . . 
Lario: Why didn‟t you produce your spreadsheet? 
Soudry: To produce the spreadsheet? 
Lario: Yes. 
Soudry: I could produce it if you would like. 
Lario: Why didn‟t you? 
Soudry: I didn‟t think I should produce it. 
Lario: Why? 
Soudry: Did you ask for a spreadsheet? 
Lario: I asked for all of the information upon which you‟ve relied and 
reviewed, yes, I did[.] 
Soudry: My— 
Elliott: I think it‟s here. He did produce it. That‟s his spreadsheet. 
. . . . 
Lario: Mr. Soudry, are you sitting here and telling me today that there are 
other spreadsheets that you prepared that support your list of terminated 
employees that you did not produce? 
Elliott: Yes, by mistake. That‟s the whole point of this information that he 
mistakenly produced to you. 
Lario: I‟ve asked your witness a question. 
Elliott: I can finish. I can finish . . . 
(App. 15-17.) The Magistrate Judge explained that she was “very troubled by the 
completely objectionable conduct of counsel in defending [Soudry‟s] deposition” (App. 
32), because in her estimation Elliott‟s interjections went “beyond just suggesting an 
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answer” and amounted to “testifying for the expert witness . . . throughout the deposition 
testimony,” (App. 30). 
The second discovery event relevant to this appeal followed the Magistrate Judge 
order that Elliott serve her expert reports “no later than October 1, 2009.” Elliott first 
served Soudry‟s expert witness report on September 14, 2009. After Givaudan‟s 
November 5, 2009, deposition of Soudry—the substance of which proved very damaging 
to key aspects of Deville‟s case—Elliott produced a new report that changed data in 
Soudry‟s original “final” report. Elliott filed the new report without notice on November 
10, 2009—more than one month after the October 1 deadline. The Magistrate Judge 
concluded that (1) the late report violated the discovery schedule and (2) changes in the 
amended report were material because they rendered large portions of the expert‟s 
deposition worthless. Noting that she was particularly troubled by attorney Elliott‟s 
conduct during Soudry‟s deposition, the Magistrate Judge offered Elliott a choice: 
withdraw the offending report, or face monetary sanctions. Elliott chose the monetary 
sanctions. 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Givaudan on Deville‟s age 
discrimination claims and her retaliation claims, under both the ADEA and the NJLAD, 
after determining that Deville had failed to carry her burden under McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The District Court also affirmed the Magistrate 
Judge‟s sanction order, finding it a proper exercise of discretion under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Deville now appeals the District Court‟s entry of summary judgment, 
and Elliott appeals its order affirming the Magistrate Judge‟s sanction award. We 
consolidated both appeals into this proceeding. 
II. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
and 29 U.S.C. § 621. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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When reviewing a District Court‟s summary judgment order, we consider legal 
conclusions de novo, Brisbin v. Superior Value Co., 398 F.3d 279, 285 (3d Cir. 2005), 
and we review factual findings for clear error, Prusky v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 
252, 257-258 (3d Cir. 2008). 
“The decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations and any determination 
as to what sanctions are appropriate are matters generally entrusted to the discretion of 
the district court.” Bowers v. Nat‟l Collegiate Athletics Ass‟n, 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
III. 
We will affirm the District Court‟s order affirming the Magistrate Judge‟s entry of 
summary judgment against Deville. Although Deville alleged violations of the ADEA 
and the NJLAD, her burdens of pleading and production are identical under each. See 
McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 827-830 (3d Cir. 1994). We agree that, under 
the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792, she did not bear her 
burden of showing pretext in the non-discriminatory explanations Givaudan gave for its 
decision to terminate and to not rehire Deville. 
We will also affirm the District Court‟s order affirming the Magistrate Judge‟s 
sanction in this case, because upon review of the record we find no abuse of the 
Magistrate Judge‟s discretion. 
A. 
We turn first to Deville‟s age discrimination claims against Givaudan. Deville‟s 
age discrimination and retaliation claims under the ADEA and under the NJLAD are 
governed by the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
792. See Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 2009) (analyzing cases 
and concluding that McDonnell Douglas applies to age discrimination claims); Lehmann 
v. Toys „R‟ Us., Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 626 (1993) (applying McDonnell Douglas to NJLAD 
claims). 
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Under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiffs bear the burden of proof and production to 
make out a prima facie case, which means they must show that (1) the plaintiff is 40 
years of age or older; (2) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the 
plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question; and (4) the plaintiff 
was ultimately replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger to support an 
inference of discriminatory animus. Smith, 589 F.3d at 690 (citing Potence v. Hazleton 
Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2004)). “Once the plaintiff satisfies these 
elements, the burden of production shifts to the employer to identify a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Keller v. Orix 
Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997)). If the employer does so, the 
burden of production returns to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate that the employer‟s 
proffered rationale was a pretext for age discrimination. Id. at 691 (citing Starceski v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1095 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995)). “At all times, 
however, the burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff.” Id.  
Of the many contentions Deville makes in urging us to reverse the District Court‟s 
summary judgment order, only two merit discussion: her claim (1) that Givaudan 
eliminated her position because it was discriminating against her on the basis of age, and 
(2) that Givaudan retaliated against her by refusing to hire her for another position, 
because she told the company she had filed an EEOC charge. Although the parties make 
strident arguments addressing every juncture of the McDonnell Douglas framework, we 
will resolve this appeal at the third stage because we conclude that Givaudan offered 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions regarding Deville, and that Deville 
has not met her burden to show they were pretext. 
Givaudan met its McDonnell Douglas burden to demonstrate legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for eliminating Deville‟s position when it explained that her 
presentation skills were “horrendous,” and that a corporate merger rendered her position 
redundant with that of another employee, who was better qualified, more experienced in 
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the relevant work area, had excellent presentation skills, and was also over the age of 40. 
See Smith, 589 F.3d at 690 (citing 411 U.S. 792). Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas and 
Smith, Deville therefore bore the burden of showing these reasons were pretexts for age 
discrimination. Id. To carry her burden, Deville produced an email from one of her 
supervisors. The email, which discussed a possible promotion for Deville, expressed 
concern that she might not be the best fit for Client A or for Givaudan, and warned that 
(considering her age) promoting her now might make it difficult to change her position in 
the future. (App. 5-6 (“By promoting her we are reinforcing that she is doing a great job 
which, when combined with her age and her gender, will make it very difficult to make a 
change.”).) 
We agree with the District Court that the frank assessment set forth in the email 
was not probative of actual intent to discriminate. It was merely a prediction in which its 
author noted correctly that it is difficult to terminate employees in protected classes. The 
email would not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Givaudan‟s decision to hire a 
more experienced, better educated, middle-aged employee who had better presentation 
skills, was motivated by animus against persons over 40 years of age. 
Givaudan also met its McDonnell Douglas burden to demonstrate legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for its decision not to hire Deville for the New York sales 
position. In November of 2007, Deville (who holds no college degree) interviewed with 
Givaudan for a position advertised as requiring a bachelor‟s degree, and preferring a 
master‟s degree. At the interview she stated that she had filed an EEOC charge against 
Givaudan. (In fact, she had not done so; she had completed an intake form with the 
EEOC, but did not lodge her complaint until approximately one month after the 
interview.) Givaudan asserts that it did not hire Deville because she was unqualified—
after interviewing several candidates, it selected a woman with a master‟s degree. 
Because the reasons Givaudan has articulated are legitimate and non-
discriminatory, the burden shifts back to Deville, Smith, 589 F.3d at 690 (citing 411 U.S. 
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792), who must produce evidence that “prove[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the articulated reasons are a pretext for discrimination,” Duffy v. Paper Magic Group, 
Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 167 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). To do so, Deville contends that because she 
told the interviewer she had filed an EEOC charge, there is a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the company refused to hire her because she did not possess the 
necessary college degree. We disagree. No reasonable jury could conclude, based on 
Deville‟s misleading statements about her EEOC filing, that she was indeed qualified for 
the position: the job “required” a bachelor‟s degree and it “preferred” a master‟s degree, 
neither of which she held. Nothing she said, or could have said, during the interview casts 
doubt on those facts, much less shows “by a preponderance of the evidence” that 
Givaudan used her lack of qualification as a pretext. Id. The District Court therefore 
determined correctly that Deville had not met her burden of production. 
Because we conclude that Deville did not bear her McDonnell Douglas burden of 
producing evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that Givaudan gave pretextual 
reasons for its decision to eliminate her position and for its decision not to re-hire her, we 
will affirm the District Court‟s summary judgment order. 
B. 
The second issue before us is attorney Vanessa R. Elliott‟s contention that the 
Magistrate Judge abused her discretion in imposing sanctions for discovery-related 
misconduct in this case. Our standard of review is highly deferential; a district court 
abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions when it bases its ruling (1) “on an erroneous 
view of the law” or (2) “on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Cooter & 
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). 
As a threshold matter, the Magistrate Judge in this case did not make a “clearly 
erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. The record fully supports the Magistrate 
Judge‟s findings that, in addition to filing documents that materially changed a key expert 
witness‟s testimony after his deposition and outside the court-approved filing deadline, 
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Elliott behaved in an abusive, unprofessional, and obstructionist manner during the 
deposition itself. (See App. 15-17.) We also have no difficulty in agreeing with the 
Magistrate Judge that Elliott‟s conduct was “unprofessional and completely 
objectionable” (App. 32), and “completely unacceptable, and . . . contrary to the rules of 
civil procedure,” (App. 30). We have no doubt that Elliott acted as “a person who 
impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.” Rule 30(d)(2).  
The remaining question is whether the District Court “based its ruling on an 
erroneous view of the law.” Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405. We conclude that it did not. The 
Magistrate Judge applied sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) (“Failure to Comply with a 
Court Order”) (see App. 34), which permits: 
Payment of Expenses. Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the 
court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or 
both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney‟s fees, caused by 
the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Elliott‟s primary argument is that the Magistrate 
Judge and the District Court did not properly consider whether her failure to comply with 
discovery rules was “substantially justified.” We disagree. 
This Court held in United States v. Grider, 580 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 2009), that when 
the text of a sanction rule provides that parties may be sanctioned if their behavior lacks 
“substantial justification,” district courts must make express rulings upon whether the 
offending party‟s conduct was “substantially justified.” Id. at 139 (vacating Rule 26(g) 
sanctions because the trial court “failed to analyze the „substantial justification‟ standard 
expressly articulated in the Rule”); id. at 140 (vacating Rule 37(c)(1) sanctions for the 
same reason). We vacated the sanction award in that case because there was “nothing in 
[the district court‟s opinion] that discusse[d] the contours of this standard or explain[d] 
the ways in which the Appellants‟ legal positions were not substantially justified.” Id. at 
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139. Grider therefore provides that District Courts may not apply sanctions under Rules 
26 and 37 without considering whether the sanctioned conduct was “substantially 
justified.” 
We conclude that the Magistrate Judge‟s oral opinion applying Rule 37(b)(2) 
satisfied Grider‟s requirements. Rule 37(b)(2) states that sanctions are appropriate unless 
the sanctionable conduct was “substantially justified.” Elliott asserts she had “substantial 
justification” to file the late report for two reasons: (1) the alterations made to the expert 
report were non-sanctionable because they were “corrections” and “de minimus [sic],” 
and (2) her Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) duty to supplement or correct her prior 
filings obliged her to file the report. Under Grider, she must persuade us that the 
Magistrate Judge did not adequately consider these asserted justifications. 
The Magistrate Judge did consider these justifications.  She made an express 
finding that the correction amounted to an alteration of material facts within the expert‟s 
report. (App. 31.)  Elliott‟s own conduct confirms this finding: the Magistrate Judge 
offered to allow her to avoid monetary sanctions by withdrawing the amended report 
(App. 33-34), but Elliott declined—something she would not have chosen to do if the 
report‟s amendments were in fact “de minimis” corrections.  The Magistrate Judge 
therefore made an express ruling upon Elliott‟s first “substantial justification” argument, 
as Grider requires. 
The Magistrate Judge also considered Elliott‟s second asserted justification, and 
made an express finding that Rule 26(e) did not justify her conduct in this case. (App. 
32.) The Magistrate Judge explained that the proper procedure for an attorney who 
wishes to violate a scheduling order is to ask the court for leave. (Id. (“What I would 
expect a lawyer familiar with procedure in this court do to is send a letter to me 
explaining the situation and asking permission to service a report—a supplemental report 
out of time . . .”).) The Magistrate Judge ruled that even if Rule 26(e) required Elliott to 
submit further filings in this case, it did not excuse her from asking the court‟s permission 
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to violate a standing order. The Magistrate Judge therefore made an express ruling upon 
Elliott‟s second “substantial justification” argument, as Grider requires. 
Finally, we note the Magistrate Judge‟s remarks to the effect that she had authority 
under Rule 30 to sanction for the deposition conduct. Although the Magistrate Judge‟s 
oral opinion is unclear as to whether she rendered her sanctions pursuant to Rule 30 as 
well as to Rule 37, it certainly would have been within her discretion to do so. Rule 
30(d)(2) provides: 
The court may impose an appropriate sanction—including the reasonable 
expenses and attorney‟s fees incurred by any party—on a person who 
impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent. 
The Magistrate Judge made extensive findings that Elliott violated Rule 30 when she 
testified on behalf of her witness by way of suggestive speaking objections. (See App. 27, 
30, 31, 32.) Under Rule 30(d)(2), the Magistrate Judge had authority to impose an 
“appropriate sanction” for this conduct. See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525 
(E.D.P.A. 1993). Her findings, in light of the authority granted to her by Rule 30(d)(2), 
confirm our conclusion that it was within the Magistrate Judge‟s discretion to impose 
sanctions in this case. 
At bottom, sanctions awards are discretionary rulings committed to the judges who 
are most familiar with the parties and their conduct. Bowers v. Nat‟l Collegiate Athletics 
Ass‟n, 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The decision to impose sanctions for discovery 
violations and any determination as to what sanctions are appropriate are matters 
generally entrusted to the discretion of the district court.”) We do not reverse them 
lightly—particularly in cases like this one, where the issue has been twice reviewed and 
carefully considered by the two trial judges most intimate with the discovery process in 
the case at bar. We conclude that Elliott has not demonstrated that both of those judges 
abused their discretion. We will therefore affirm the District Court. 
* * * * * 
